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Abstract
In this paper I will focus on the concept of the person in its philosophical, repre-
sentative and bodily facets, in a gender perspective. Starting from the interesting fig-
ure of Gianna Beretta Molla, known for having been beatified for having sacrificed 
her own life to save that of the child she was carrying, I’ll try to reason about some 
key concepts concerning women representation in modernity, such as motherhood, 
iconic figures and cultural models from which the meaning of feminine subjects 
itself depends.
Keywords Gender · Gender semiotics · Cultural models · Icons · Motherhood 
models · Religion models · Abortion low
1 Introduction
As part of the “gender oriented” perspective in which my work is positioned, it is not 
only interesting but also necessary to question how and in what forms the concept of 
the person is constructed in its philosophical, representative and bodily facets.
As subjects, we occupy certain discursive positions and present ourselves as com-
plex subjects. We do not appear only as entities generating proxemics and passions, 
but also as texts that can be examined in relation to identity pathways of significa-
tion, mechanisms for the construction and deconstruction of meanings, developing 
meaning effects and practices for generating semiosis.
According to Ugo Volli, “the ‘I’ is realized in the same way as a certain mode of 
production of discourse, with an exterior being separated from an interior through 
(self-)communication; and [because] this idea of the way human beings are consti-
tuted is by no means natural or universal, but rather was progressively constituted in 
the West, through discourses and the formation of a philosophical, poetic, and reli-
gious order” [1: 71, my translation].
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In some way, therefore, the experience of the “I” depends on being inserted in 
certain communicative positions. In order to do so, to be inserted in a communica-
tive position, the subject must be thought of as a specific individual with a certain 
identity as a person.
However, are there frames within which we situate ourselves while constituting 
ourselves as subjects of communication, frames that we use to know how to be in 
the world? How do these possible external senders also condition our existence as 
engendered subjects [2]? If we consider gender to be the set of social and cultural 
expectations that are built around individuals by virtue of their belonging to a spe-
cific biological sex, it is immediately clear how important it is to further investi-
gate the way these expectations are not only generated, but also fed and reinforced 
through cultural texts.
2  Gianna Beretta Molla and Canonization
The arguments presented here originate from my virtual encounter with a figure I 
consider interesting in the current paradigm of gender studies because of the dis-
courses that have developed, often ideologically, around her and a specific issue, 
motherhood. It is evident that motherhood deeply touches (and in some way chal-
lenges) the very foundation of gender studies, namely the belief that there is a differ-
ence between the biological and the socio-cultural levels characterizing individuals, 
that is, people.
The figure in question is Gianna Beretta Molla, a woman who lived in Milan in 
the first half of the twentieth century. Gianna is known for having sacrificed her own 
life to save that of the child she was carrying, thus acting with what Pope Paul VI 
later defined during the Sunday Angelus of 23 September 1972 as “meditated immo-
lation”.1 Gianna’s story may certainly appear quite similar to those of many other 
women who made analogous choices. What makes Gianna’s life extraordinary, how-
ever, is the fact that a cause for her canonization was initiated in 1972 and ended on 
16 May 2004 with her canonization. It is not my intention, here, to revisit the entire 
human and juridical story accompanying this trial. It is, however, necessary to raise 
some purely cultural and textual, and to some extent communicative, issues to better 
frame the considerations I lay out here regarding the figure of Gianna as a model of 
femininity and femaleness.
In the Catholic context, Gianna’s choice appears perfectly logical: according to 
the conciliar Church, everyone must pursue holiness regardless of their personal and 
social status, even the laity. One of the ways spouses can do this is by educating their 
offspring in Christian doctrine and defending the core model of the Christian family 
from actors (and laws) that may appear to threaten it. Laws, for instance, such as the 
one on divorce (in Italy, legal since 1970) and the one on abortion, passed in 1978.
One of the main documents of the Second Vatican Council, Gaudium et Spes, 
is dated 1965 and it is easy to imagine how historically full those years must have 
1 Regarding Gianna’s life, see Ponzo (infra).
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been, with changes at the social and cultural levels in terms of not only the idea of 
family, but also the idea of female emancipation. Gaudium et Spes clearly states that 
“the ability to do good must be exercised not by instinct, nor by external coercion, 
but in the full exercise of freedom, as a prerogative of human dignity”. I believe this 
point to be particularly interesting from a semiotic perspective in that it introduces 
a clear reference to the problem of the recipient: there is a tension, more or less 
resolved, between the destination instance external to the subject (the law, dogma, 
faith, the Bible, and God) and the subject’s own perspective. How much of this free-
dom that Gaudium et Spes speaks of is defined by the subject him/herself as his or 
her own narrative program?
The document clarifies that everything that goes against human life (from tor-
ture to mutilation, genocide to murder, euthanasia and, of course, abortion) must 
be avoided because it offends human dignity. Although “it is deeply to be deplored 
that these basic personal rights are not yet being respected everywhere, as is the case 
with women who are denied the chance freely to choose a husband, or a state of 
life, or to have access to the same educational and cultural benefits as are available 
to men”, anything counter to human life is nonetheless misguided. Women must be 
free to choose marriage as a life state, but this choice implies conforming to prin-
ciples and a clearly defined narrative scheme: “Marriage and conjugal love are by 
their nature ordained toward the begetting and educating of children” [Gaudium et 
spes 1965: no. 50].
In acknowledging that there are social and economic circumstances that may 
lead couples to regulate and reduce their procreation, and that the conjugal union 
is important for the harmony of the couple and family, the Council allows spouses 
to practice birth control but only by acting according to the biological rhythms of 
the human body. The use of artificial methods of contraception are not allowed, let 
alone abortion, and this latter is defined as a crime against the human person. The 
sentiments expressed in Gaudium et spes were later softened (for example, begin-
ning from the 1968 encyclical Humanae vitae in which Pope Paul VI reaffirms the 
possibility of controlling the number of births to meet the needs of responsible par-
enthood), but the overall position remained unchanged: a very precise narrative pro-
gram, hetero-directed and heteronormative, imposed for families in which the object 
of value of the narrative plan is offspring. As mentioned above, this is obviously not 
surprising if compared to the collective imaginary of Christian culture we are famil-
iar with, albeit with varying levels of competence and compliance.
In some way, therefore, the figure of Gianna may be considered strategic for the 
Church in a period in which the abortion debate was becoming socially heated. 
Gianna was a lay person, a woman, a mother and above all a doctor; as such, she was 
fully aware of the consequences of not terminating her fourth pregnancy, the one 
that led to her death (and moreover it is worth noting that, before Gianna, no cause 
for beatification had been conducted for this kind of thing: the factors of holiness 
were martyrdom or heroism, not being a mother).
As Jenny Ponzo shows in her article in this issue, in the process of drafting her 
canonization cause the sanctified and public figure of Gianna drew further and fur-
ther away from her concrete, real, figure. The former enjoyed growing autonomy and 
ended up functioning similarly to a brand: a system of values and a precise thematic 
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role linked to Gianna’s face and name. That of the mother. Or, better, “martyr of 
motherhood”, “mother martyr”, “martyr of maternal love”, or “martyr of duty and 
love” (as she was repeatedly defined in the documents leading to her beatification). 
In fact, there are numerous pro-life centres, associations and sites in existence today 
that are dedicated to Gianna or more generally refer to her figure.
3  Icons, Imaginaries and Models
To better understand thus the effects of meaning that constructing this “brand” 
around the “person” of Gianna Beretta Molla produces, we need to think about the 
meaning of the word “icon”.
Beginning from the general semiotic theory and assuming Peirce’s definition of 
this term, every time a sign has a relation of similarity with the reality of the exter-
nal world there is an icon. Obviously, it is immediately clear that this basic definition 
is not sufficient to explain such a complex phenomenon as iconicity, whose basis is 
not so much in cross-references between signifier and signified of a denotative type, 
but rather of a connotative type: “iconicity, although generated by a set of semiotic 
procedures […] is founded in the system of social connotations underlying the set 
of semiotics” [3: 149]. Meaning is produced through the staging, in the discursive 
surface of the text, of themes in the form of figures which are clear and evocative 
enough to suggest some referential illusion.
Yet what are the textual, syntactic and semantic mechanisms that allow “icons” 
such as this to take root in collective imaginaries?
Imaginaries are nothing but lazy machines characterized by what we could define 
as “controlled dynamism”: exceptions, outrages, and deviations from the norm must 
be included in so far as they serve to confirm and consolidate the norm itself. Fol-
lowing Wunenburger [4: 19], the imaginary is a set of productions, either mental or 
concretized in works, with a visual (paintings, drawings, photographs) and linguistic 
(metaphors, symbols, stories) base, capable of forming coherent and dynamic sets 
that, starting from a symbolic function, bring about figurative sense interlocking. 
Such interlocking, however, is valid only if there is a certain encyclopaedia or, we 
might say, it is linked to the worldview of a certain culture in a certain historical 
period because only within that culture is it possible to trigger, on a connotative 
level, those inferences that we require to disambiguate certain signs and associate 
certain figures with certain values, on a profound level.
Differently stated, the operation of any figurative imaginary depends on highly 
precise cultural models, recurring discursive configurations governed by precise 
narrative patterns that hold together encyclopaedias of signs. Cultural models are 
discursive matrixes—or grammars—that serve as the basis for building our vision 
of the world and defining everything around us: things, events, feelings, and abstract 
concepts.
The imaginary must therefore be seen as a structure, “a system made up of rela-
tions among the images themselves that take on precise meanings precisely because 
they are associated or opposed in a certain way” [5: 186, my translation].
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On the other hand, we know that the functioning of a culture depends on the 
pieces of information circulating within it being passed on, handed down and 
exchanged in such a way as to be comparable: culture requires a limited number of 
stereotypical forms, patterns, archetypes, and symbols.
Icons work thanks to this general principle of culture: similarly to brands, they 
are structured as strong images that serve as the centres for systems of recognizable 
and shared values with which individuals can clearly identify. To state it in semiotic 
terms, they are collective senders, external to the subject, that guide both choices 
and the system of social expectations linked to the very idea of “person”.
Gianna’s case is a concrete example of this system: hers is an emblematic story 
(I will speak extensively below about the specific issue linking the system of social 
expectations surrounding the woman and her “having to be” a mother) that looms as 
mythical in the Barthesian sense of the term. Like the Abbé Pierre of Mythologies 
[6], it thematizes the current historical need to create accessible heroes in a logic of 
humanizing archetypes, on one hand, while on the other hand it serves to heroicize 
ordinary men and women, making them into figures that transcend time and situated 
identity. This is, moreover, an issue that we see replicated in the form of a pattern 
in many areas of contemporary communication modes as if they were favoured (if 
not actually generated) by today’s media system. Indeed, social networks and online 
newspapers but also, more specifically, the genre of short videos as the main expres-
sive mode of communication seem to have definitively mixed the traditional order 
of “a few fawned over by many”—typical, for example, of Hollywood cinema—in 
the apparently more democratic logic of “many fawned over by many” (I should say 
“followed” by many, given that the mechanism is that of followers) characteristic of 
contemporary models/brands/influencers/people.
To return to our topic, I see this point giving rise to at least three orders of issues: 
(i) the first, contingent one, questions the models of gender identity that Gianna and 
other similar figures propose as forms of identification and negotiation of the social 
roles of women and maternal women in particular; (ii) the second issue, mediatic 
in nature, has to do with the textual mechanisms that trigger and root these iconic 
forms through contemporary communicational instruments; and (iii) the last and 
most general opens the way to considerations about subjectivity and the very idea of 
“person”.
3.1  “Having to be a Mother”: Nature or Culture?
There is a nearly endless stream of documentation about Gianna Beretta Molla 
available on the web, from the Wikipedia page dedicated to her to the remarkable 
number of articles and references on the portals of the major Italian Catholic and 
non-Catholic newspapers. The website giannaberettamolla.org features not only her 
story, but also a rich web of secondary texts stemming from the figure of the woman/
saint. It is worth recalling if only for typological reasons that these include a video-
documentary created by the Canadian Catholic television network Salt and Light 
Television with the evocative title Life is a Choice, available in English, French and 
Spanish, a musical show titled Niente le cose per metà (in reference to a sentence 
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from notes as a young women that is interpreted as a motto of consistency in the life 
of the saint), a photographic exhibition featuring a number of panels permanently 
displayed at key sites of the woman’s life and available for temporary installations. 
Typing the search term “Gianna Beretta Molla”, youtube.com provides hundreds of 
research results, each with thousands of views: interviews, video-documentaries, in-
depth journalistic investigations, historical reconstructions, etc. Additionally, there 
is a Facebook page, Instagram profile and Twitter account dedicated to this figure. 
The web also provides a long list of intertextual references to other figures consid-
ered similar to Gianna, women who, like her, lived lives of “meditated immolation” 
(as defined in the aforementioned speech by Pope Paul VI during an Angelus in Sep-
tember 1972). These are other “martyrs of motherhood” such as Chiara Corbella 
Petrillo, a woman who chose not to treat the cancer that led her to death in order to 
preserve the life of the child she was carrying and for whom a cause of beatification 
and canonization is underway.
Browsing through the pages and looking at the videos covering these figures, we 
immediately notice two very precise and intertwined thematic isotopies that unfold 
in the texts: on one hand, the theme of time and its eternal flow, on the other hand 
the theme of smiling that figuratively represents the value of unconditional and 
uncompromising faith.
Time is an interesting topic and, as I have pointed out elsewhere […] it appears 
extensively in the contemporary mediatic system of narratives on women. This issue 
is presented in the numerous references (and not only in the official texts concerning 
Gianna’s canonization, but also in all the corollary media texts outlined above) in 
polemical terms: there is a present time which is ephemeral, ineffable and above all 
possessed of an end opposed to an eternal time, the only one endowed with concrete 
value. The first is compressed to the same extent that the second is extended. Earthly 
time is voided of meaning to the same extent that the other time is granted universal 
value. If anything, earthly time is considered valuable when it benefits the only basic 
value of individuals, namely eternity.
It is interesting, perhaps obvious, to note that contemporary feminist discourses 
(by which I mean the body of texts produced by the various feminist movements, 
both as iconic public discourses and as written textuality), tend to axiologize time 
in exactly the opposite way: If not now, when?2 The feminists tell us it is the time of 
present action, the positive and euphoric time. There is no deferment to the future.
In the discourses surrounding Gianna and the others, eternal life instead renders 
us “super-human” and definitively resolves that conflict with time that, as typical 
of being “simply” human, is seen as triggering some form of deviation, separation, 
or distance from the mainstream. Since time is no longer a relative and subjective 
parameter, we no longer need to govern its flow and this awareness leads to hap-
piness as so effectively represented by the smile isotopy: “Gianna bestowed her 
open smile, full of sweetness and calm, a reflection of the serene and deep joy of a 
2 To deepen: [7].
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peaceful soul”; she was “radiant in her joy and smile”.3 Talking about Chiara Cor-
bella, every page and document displays a picture of her with a wide smile and a 
violin in her hand (music, represented by the instrument, is another theme that is 
reunited with that of time: music has no time; it transcends time, suspends time and 
reconnects us with past time), while wearing a bandage on her face to cover the eye 
affected by the lymph node cancer that was killing her.
The interlocking of these two topics has served as the discursive basis for build-
ing media representation of the figures of Gianna, Chiara and other women with 
similar life trajectories through the figure of motherhood as something women “have 
to be”, the source of eternal joy—smiles.
In the case of our “icons”, Gianna and Chiara, the theme of maternity is clearly 
connected to the above-noted theme of abortion, an issue which has always radically 
divided Catholicism, on one hand, and feminism, or rather forms of feminism in the 
plural, on the other. This division originates from and is carried out on women’s 
bodies and the very idea of what it means to be a “woman”.
Those who are familiar with gender studies know well that gender is nothing 
more than a collective sender, that is, the variegated set of social and cultural expec-
tations that transform a biological datum, sex, into a set of behaviours, attitudes, 
roles, and individual social trajectories. In short, gender is a category that defines 
not only the way in which sexual belonging is experienced by individual men and 
women, but also the way in which it is communicated, conveyed, and represented 
by the tools of socialization such as the family, school and, of course, the media. 
Conversely, representations are in some way responsible for determining individu-
als’ possibilities for self-recognition in that identity is built and semanticized within 
them.
Motherhood has been and continues to be one of the themes that, histori-
cally more than any other, we have placed at the centre of media representations 
of women/femininity; this centrality is due both to those who support the essential 
nature of motherhood and those who instead assert women’s freedom to choose. The 
cause is mainly contingent: motherhood is “naturally” linked to women’s bodies. In 
the unfolding of feminist narratives, therefore, debate oscillates between nature and 
culture in relation to the topic of motherhood.
Let us proceed in the proper order, however: what is the body, from a historical, 
semiotic and philosophical point of view? If we were to try to provide a discursive 
definition of “body”, I think we would have to refer to it as a spatial and temporal 
entity endowed with a relative existence, immersed in a precise historical context 
and related to other bodies and, more generally, to the culture of reference. To quote 
Ugo Volli [8], not even the material structure of the body and its appearance depend 
solely on universal and genetic features (nor on the subjective expression animating 
it). Rather, they are shaped by the individual society that body is part of, in its com-
plex sociological, historical, anthropological dimension. It follows that the body is 
3 It is possible to find a certain numbers of quotes concerning these aspects of Gianna’s personality in 
several websites reporting her life as a woman and as a saing. See for example: www. https ://aigoc .it/
santa -giann a-beret ta-molla /
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likewise a primarily “cultural body”, dependent on a certain system of rules, beliefs, 
expectations, and values defined collectively by society.
On the other hand, the body is what we are able to see and therefore enjoy of 
other people in the world. It is this fact that generates debates around the body in 
which the border between private and public becomes transparent and porous and 
issues emerge that have more to do with politics than with people (such as the right/
duty to motherhood).
Echoing the typology of bodies developed by Marsciani [9], we could perhaps 
speak, in this case, of a body-uterus: the woman’s body as a container or an instru-
ment of passage towards the condition of motherhood. It is, therefore, a body that 
comes to signify by virtue of a role and on which abortion thus appears as a vari-
able that disturbs the norm (i.e. with respect to a collective imaginary) according to 
which motherhood is the ultimate goal of female existence because it is the expres-
sion of a content that is substantiated by the very nature of women’s bodies (as men-
tioned above, motherhood is necessarily and thus, by translation, naturally related to 
the female body).
This perspective might aid in understanding the major debate that took place in 
Italy in the 1970s with the passage of Law 194 introducing “Norms for the social 
protection of motherhood and on the voluntary interruption of pregnancy”. The 
debate was heated not so much, or only, because it raised ethical issues in the Cath-
olic arena, but rather because it suggested that another nature could be connected 
to women’s bodies, an alternative nature or non-nature, a nature that had been de-
natured in some way.
In reality, the same identical issue also emerged in the juridical (as well as philo-
sophical and cultural) debate that developed around an equal and opposite issue, that 
of gestation carried out for others or, in other words, surrogate motherhood4: when 
motherhood stops being mainly a matter of nature and becomes a juridical issue, 
how is the relationship between woman and motherhood substantiated? How should 
we think or rethink the very idea of “being a mother”?
This is how the person-woman-mother-icon/model short-circuit is forged and 
becomes socially significant.
It might be useful at this point to make a brief digression into the text of Law 
194. Before 1978, any form of voluntary pregnancy termination was considered a 
criminal offence. Law no. 194 mitigated the penalisation of abortion and regulated 
its practice, stressing both women’s freedom and their right to choose in matters of 
pregnancy termination, and the need to protect “human life from its beginning”.
Article 1 clearly states that “interruption of pregnancy, as referred to in this law, 
is not a means of birth control”. It is this aspect that makes the facilities focused on 
helping women in difficulty, primarily women’s clinics and doctors, so important, 
although mainly in keeping with the principle (or limitation, we might say) laid out 
in Article 1.
Thus, while Article 4 states that women may turn to a public women’s clinic for 
abortion within the first ninety days of pregnancy if they experience “circumstances 
4 Regarding this point, see Pezzini [10], Niccolai [11] and Long [12], among others.
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in which carrying forward their pregnancy, childbirth or motherhood would consti-
tute a serious danger to their physical or mental health, in relation to either their 
state of health, or to their economic, social or family circumstances, or to the cir-
cumstances in which conception occurred, or to forecasts of anomalies or malfor-
mations of the conceptus”, Article 5 immediately admonishes that the same clinic 
must, however, carry out the necessary medical examinations and also explore 
“with the woman and the father of the embryo, whenever the woman permits, fully 
respecting the dignity and confidentiality of the woman and the person indicated as 
the father of the conceptus, the possible solutions to the problems presented, to help 
her remove the causes that would lead to interrupt the pregnancy, to enable her to 
assert her rights as a worker and mother, to promote any appropriate action aimed at 
supporting the woman, offering her all the necessary aid both during pregnancy and 
after birth”.
Article 6 outlines the cases in which the termination of pregnancy is possible 
after the 90-day period: “when pregnancy or childbirth poses a serious danger to the 
woman’s life” and “when pathological processes are detected, including those relat-
ing to significant anomalies or malformations of the unborn child, posing a serious 
danger to the woman’s physical or mental health”.
Finally, Article 9 states that health professionals “shall not be required to take 
part in procedures [directly related to the voluntary interruption of pregnancy] when 
a conscientious objection is raised”.5 Article 9 providing for conscientious objectors 
is one of the most problematic points of Law 194 because, while from a purely prac-
tical point of view a doctor refusing to practice abortion potentially causes organiza-
tional issues in hospital facilities, the most important problem instead lies in a legal 
and behavioural sphere because it substantiates an ethical judgment on abortion 
itself: paradoxically, a practice that is institutionalized, legalized and standardized is 
simultaneously made to undergo a mechanism of moral censorship by those tasked 
with enacting it.
This should not come as a surprise to semioticians because, as Landowski [13] 
has pointed out, the “legal” sphere, being a language, is structured in the form 
of a narrative and therefore contains all the same elements as other types of nar-
rative: a will, subject, mandate, contract, object, delegation, sanction, etc.. The 
law is not, therefore, a machine that operates by issuing decrees as in the Ten 
Commandments, a series of prescriptions and bans. Rather, it is an instrument 
for regulating social relations. The law dispenses modal values; it creates them, 
moves them, and recognizes them as pre-existing its own intervention. Laws are 
not intended to regiment the inner life of “people”, but only to organize their 
social life; they become an interpretative code—a language—for constructing 
social relations. On the other hand, every legislative grammar is a “will to do” 
5 A fact that might be interesting from a historical point of view concerns the Referendum for the abro-
gation of Law 194 that was held in Italy in 1981: although the law’s formulation and entry into force 
were accompanied by heated controversy raised by the Catholic fringes of public opinion, when the 
“Movimento per la vita” called for its abrogation 7 years later the referendum was rejected with a signifi-
cant 68% against: Italy was fully in favour of the practice of voluntary pregnancy termination.
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which is translated into a “must do” [14] thanks to the work of legislators who 
perceive social interests and turn them into legitimate interests. According to 
Greimas [ibid], law puts into play a collective actant, one that is not embodied or 
made explicit through figures of single individuals but is nonetheless the neces-
sary basis allowing legal discourse to take charge of a constituent principle of its 
own, namely the equality of all before the law.
What makes 194 “special” is the fact that it directly involves women’s bodies 
as a site of control and negotiation of power. The result is a law, a document that 
by definition involves collective subjects rather than single individuals, that ends 
up making decisions concerning a matter as private and “personal” as the bodies 
of individuals and the sphere of sexuality. In these issues, equality among humans 
collides with the need for subjects to be “embodied” in individual bodies (with 
individual needs, drives, desires, considerations, etc. and, above all, individual 
gender designations).
In short, when subjects become “engendered” (as the subjects to which 194 
refers necessarily are), the universality of the collective actant wobbles because 
gender is precisely the semiotic variable around which not equality but rather dif-
ference (social and cultural) is articulated. This postulate is all the more valid if 
we consider the particular field in which the law is applied, maternity, a field in 
which the social and cultural likewise accumulate on subjects as “second nature” 
[15], making maternity a true socio-semiotic experience [16].
Whatever decision the law makes, whatever provision it renders explicit, it can 
only cover a real body that is not only a juridical subject but also a person, an 
embodied woman. When we think of juridical discourse, we are led to grasp in it 
the existence of a subject in its natural, physical form, and thus to assume human 
nature as a normative model. In reality, we know well that nature is always con-
structed, that it is the result of cultural options disguised as natural categories. In 
the legal discourses that orbit around real bodies, the confusion between nature 
and culture, the overlap between being and having to/being able to/being willing 
to be becomes the fulcrum for the very understanding of individual narratives.
To return to our icons, the “play” on the nature/culture controversy is evident 
in the narrative of Gianna and the others. There is a salvific nature framing them 
as happy mothers and eternal “people” lined up against a “culture” seen as some-
how evil because it is the culture of treatment and surgeries. It is the culture of 
the present trying to gain the upper hand over eternity; it is earthly life going up 
against the transcendent.
On the semantic level, therefore, the woman on one hand represents the 
embodied subject, culture, and the mother, and on the other hand she ceases to be 
an individual to instead become an icon, representing nature. Because in being a 
mother first of all, Gianna ceases to be a “person” and becomes, in fact, a collec-
tive actant, a non-token type of a discourse that turns ideological (and in fact, as 
noted above, becomes the prerogative of certain influential groups such as pro-
life movements). In so doing, it shifts the emphasis from life as a basic value to 
life as a use value for a much “higher” end: reproduction (“Woe to those girls 
who do not accept the vocation of motherhood”, Gianna tells us in one of her 
juvenile manuscripts).
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3.2  Iconic Representations: Gianna and the Others
Having clarified that, semantically speaking, the “Gianna brand” has been con-
structed through the polemical unfolding of nature and culture with the former 
“triumphing” over the latter, we must ask ourselves on a syntactic level what are 
the narrative mechanisms that foster the creation of these media icons.
I have already mentioned to the host of texts available online, but not only, 
regarding the figure of Gianna and Chiara. Their stories are the kind of sto-
ries that become exemplary and are endlessly repeated through the well-known 
mechanism of going viral. Using the virus metaphor for the creation of a cultural 
model may perhaps seem blasphemous in the times of Covid-19, but the Gianna-
model (or “martyr of motherhood”-model) is just that, a contagious model that 
takes on meaning in a diachronic rather than synchronic way. It is the sum of the 
successive superimpositions that forces us to leave behind Gianna as a “person” 
and meet her again as an icon.
In my opinion, the interesting mechanism that clearly appears to be operating 
in this case is that of the fragment: a potentially viral text can be broken down 
into blocks, moments, quotations, slogans, or individual extracts that the indi-
vidual reader may select to confirm his or her pre-existing ideological convictions 
in some way, and these become an integral part of his or her culture [7] Gianna 
and Chiara perfectly illustrate this logic as they go from smiling to tenacious to 
determined to mothers to wives, depending on the moment. In Gianna’s case, a 
great deal of importance is given to her medical training through well-considered 
textual cuts. And yet they are never described in psychological depth so as to con-
struct them as full-fledged subjectivities.
Eco speaks to this point with his definition of “ricketiness” [17, 18], that 
property of a work possessed of deep emotional content that can be dislocated, 
unhinged and enjoyed one piece at a time. It seems to me that the Gianna case fits 
this definition perfectly. To clarify, these disassembled pieces are never random, 
they must have a place in the most archaic roots of our unconscious. They must 
be archetypes, in some way, based on beliefs that are apparently individual but 
are instead deeply collective: they make individuals part of a collectivity.
3.3  People, Roles, Type and Tokens
Beginning from the example of Gianna Beretta Molla, we are investigating the 
relationship between the idea of person, subject, individual and the relationship 
between this idea and icons or, as I prefer to call them, cultural models.
In order to define this relationship, it seems we must take a step back and begin 
again from definitions. If we look up the word “person” in the dictionary, we 
find definitions that refer to the human individual as an object of consideration 
or determination within the functions and relationships of social life. This first 
point is already interesting: a “person” is such if it is related to a community. 
The Treccani dictionary reminds us that the etymology of the Latin word persōna 
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probably lies in an Etruscan word that meant “theatrical mask”. The person is 
thus an appearance, a representation of a self within a certain sphere of communi-
cation, a social group.
In the semiotic sphere, “person” corresponds to the character or, rather, the actor. 
The idea of representation, however, clearly references the idea of thematic roles: 
typical actors invested with recurring characteristics and behaviours in order to cre-
ate a certain coherence between thematic and figurative elements.
As stated above, the process of constructing the meaning of a text partly involves 
identifying isotopies and figures; it is cultural in the sense that secondary modelling 
systems give shape to our way of thinking thanks to their ability to organize reality 
and make it comprehensible. Drawing on Marrone [19: 77] thematic roles can be 
described as “consolidated social stereotypes that bring into history the weight of 
their immediate cultural recognizability”, the ability of a subject to develop a certain 
narrative path. “Analyzing a character as a person means treating him/her as an indi-
vidual endowed with his/her own intellectual, emotional, attitudinal profile and his/
her own range of behaviours, reactions, gestures” [20: 171]. If, on the other hand, 
we focus on the “types” that characters embody and their roles as opposed to tokens, 
we no longer have to consider the nuances of their personalities. We focus on the 
kinds of stances they assume rather than the wide range of behaviours or classes of 
actions they perform. “The result is that the character is no longer a unique, irreduc-
ible individual, but a codified element: it becomes a part, or better still a role, that 
punctuates and supports the narrative” [ibid.:172].
As a gender studies scholar, I cannot but consider this discourse in the more spe-
cific field of female representations: all the isotopies and metaphors of daily experi-
ence converge in the textual representations of women and, vice versa, these repre-
sentations contribute to creating interpretations and definitions of sexual identity, 
what we might call habitus, that is, the continuous process of semiosis thanks to 
which expectations, perceptions, practices, etc. converge on individuals. It is this 
quality that makes gender a semiotic device and why Teresa de Lauretis wrote about 
the en-gendering of subjects. According to the Italian scholar, “the reality of gen-
der lies precisely in the reality effects produced by its representation” [21: 98]. It is 
important to note that we are talking not about reality, but about the reality effects. 
Individuals take on themselves the effects of meaning produced by gender represen-
tations or, as de Lauretis writes, of gender technologies, i.e. those devices of power 
(including the media) in whose sphere gender models are produced and used. Gen-
der becomes first and foremost a cultural category.
The characters of the stories that we enjoy are often characterized through a core 
of elements that are already widely shared and easily recognizable because they are 
stereotyped. It is this stereotyped set of features that guides and influences, to some 
extent, our interpretation of the text.
The link is not so much (or at least not only) between the discursive level of the 
text and interpretation, therefore, but between collective imagination and interpreta-
tion: we expect certain things because we already have socially shared experiences, 
meaning, praxis and practices for those things.
This holds true for Gianna, Chiara and all the potential martyr mothers of nowa-
days: through “rickety” fragments we have access to stories that are no longer the 
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stories of those persons in that they have become the stories of models, exemplary 
models of motherhood that go beyond the boundaries of human fallibility by virtue 
of being “super-human”. They are no longer people, but fetishes. Fetishes that we 
idolize, love, and view as unreachable ideals, and that we consider perfect precisely 
because of their transcendence.
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